IT NEWS

In the year 2021, the war for computer superiority has a clear winner, and it is the Macintosh, by Apple. The company’s Pro model laptops are finally, belatedly equipped with ports that have been standard in other computers for years. The company’s beleaguered “butterfly” keyboard has seemingly been erased from history. And the base model of company’s powerhouse desktop tower could set you back a hefty $6,000.

What’s not to love?

Ribbing aside, according to our resident Mac expert at Malwarebytes, Thomas Reed, Apple has made several important decisions about device design in the past few decades to make them more secure, easier to use, and harder to tamper. And that’s a boon to users because, as Malwarebytes discovered just a couple of years ago, the threats to Mac machines increased by 400 percent from the year prior. But threats to Apple devices extend beyond laptop and desktop threats—for years, small companies have been finding vulnerabilities in Apple’s iOS mobile operating system and selling them to the highest bidders.

So, what defenses do Apple users have to prevent the increasing number of threats from impacting them directly? As Reed explained in this week’s Lock and Code episode with host David Ruiz, there’s a lot. Apple keeps bad users out, prevents clueless users from messing things up, and it works somewhat diligently to catch malware when it’s first reported on.

But not everything is as good as it should be, Reed said. In particular, Apple’s ideology about product secrecy has bled into its approach to security updates, meaning that the company has failed to provide transparent, timely communication to its users when it matters most.

“I can understand the secrecy when it comes to new products and new designs. But when it comes to security, communication is really important and Apple could really learn something from Microsoft.”

Thomas Reed, director of Mac and Mobile at Malwarebytes

Tune in to the latest episode of Lock and Code to learn about Mac security successes and failures, and about Mac history and Reed’s first experience with a computer mouse, along with a story about, reportedly, the first-ever ransomware attack in history.

You can also find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Google Podcasts, plus whatever preferred podcast platform you use.

The post Why Macs are the best, according to Mac expert Thomas Reed: Lock and Code S02E23 appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Emotet is one of the best known, and most dangerous, malware threats of the past several years.

On several occasions it appeared to take an early retirement, but it has always came back. In January of this year, a global police operation dismantled Emotet’s botnet. Law enforcement then used their control of this infrastructure to send a “self-destruct” update to Emotet executables. Infected organizations were given a few months grace to clean up the the neutered malware before the remaining copies did as they’d been instructed and ate themselves in April.

However, that wasn’t the end of the story.

Last month we reported on how another notorious bit of malware, TrickBot, was helping Emotet come back from the dead. And then yesterday, several security researchers saw another huge spike in Emotet’s activity.

Blinking light

The presence of Emotet in the threat landscape has had the appearance of a blinking red light for years. Emotet started out in 2014 as an information-stealing banking Trojan that scoured sensitive financial information from infected systems (which is why Malwarebytes detects some components as Spyware.Emotet). Over the years, it evolved into a global-scale distribution infrastructure for other malware.

During this time we have seen Emotet disappear and show up again on several occasions. In September 2019, Emotet emerged from a four month hiatus with a new spam campaign, before going back into hiding early in 2020 and reappearing in July of the same year. Its use then declined, with occasional spikes, before it returned just in time for Christmas and was then dealt a massive blow by collective law enforcement action in January this year.

Recent spikes

On the December 1, 2021, our Threat Intelligence team noted a huge spike in Emotet C2 activity.

Other researchers also noted spikes in the number of URLs being used to distribute the malware, and the number of malware samples.

From all the reports and alerts by researchers and analysts we can see a few interesting trends.

• First of all, our own research shows the global distribution of Emotet has a clear focus on the US.

• Looking at the malware URLs that URLhaus has associated with the latest Emotet campaigns, we see a lot of compromised WordPress sites.
• Only yesterday we talked about how Emotet was being spread via malicious Windows App Installer packages. While this was not an entirely new method, it is not something we see every day.
• The spam campaign used to spread the mails with the links leading to the App Installer packages was done by hijacking existing conversations, using stolen reply-chain emails.
• Researchers are seeing an uptick in the number of Emotet C2 servers.

Speculation

From this point on the content of this post is speculation, so feel free to skip it if you have developed your own theories. Or feel free to compare notes and leave your remarks in the comments.

Emotet is growing a lot faster than any newcomer to the scene could do. This seems to indicate that old relationships have been renewed, which usually means that the persons that tied these knots in the past are still working on the project and bringing “old friends” back in.

Given the global distribution and the different campaigns that are ongoing it’s likely there are several different affiliates at work. And looking at their methods we can tell that these are not some “fresh out of their mother’s basement script kiddies” either. They are using sophisticated methods and abusing vulnerabilities that haven’t been patched yet by quite a lot of organizations. For example, some Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities will allow them to hijack existing email threads, which gives the spam messages a higher credibility.

I checked the hosting companies for the WordPress sites, expecting to find a lot of GoDaddy domains that might have been compromised while their credentials were for sale. But I found a lot of different hosting companies, which makes WordPress the common denominator. It’s likely therefore that the attackers are exploiting vulnerable versions of WordPress plugins like OptinMonster, WP Fastest Cache, and WooCommerce Dynamic Pricing and Discounts, all of which were recently patched. (Although there are probably others that we do not know about yet too.)

Hard fact

Emotet is back! For how long is hard to predict, but they don’t behave as if they have any plans to retire again soon.

Stay safe, everyone!

The post Emotet’s back and it isn’t wasting any time appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

A veritable barn-stormer of an insider threat story has recently come to light.

A former employee of Ubiquiti Networks, Nickolas Sharp, has been arrested and charged for allegedly hacking company servers, stealing gigabytes of information, and then rounding it all off with a splash of extortion. This took place in December of last year, but there’s no clear reason (yet) for why he did any of it.

The alleged perpetrator might have gotten away with it too, but for several disastrous choices which ultimately led to their downfall.

Covering his tracks

Sharp clearly put some thought into the attack. Many people would perhaps just blunder across the network, leaving large but unintentional “It was me” footprints all over the place. Not so here… he made use of his network access to alter logs and more, throwing a blanket over what was actually taking place. Cleverly, he used a VPN to hide his details while doing this.

He probably thought he’d gotten away with it. However, breaches do get discovered eventually. The clock was ticking. The question was: Had he done enough?

The answer was no, he hadn’t.

Finding himself on the incident response team investigating his own attack(!), he’s alleged to have threatened to release data stolen from his employer if a ransom demand for 50 bitcoin (roughly $2 million when this all took place) wasn’t paid. According to the US Department of Justice, he then released some of the files when the ransom wasn’t forthcoming. None of this is really conducive to keeping a low profile, and the wheels started to come off.

Anonymous—up to a point

If you’re up to no good and relying on anonymity to protect you, even the slightest connection to your real life can bring the whole scheme crashing down.

Sharp’s attempts to avoid detection apparently rested with his use of a VPN. This, in theory, would keep his real IP address hidden. Law enforcement had other ideas, working out a connection between the VPN account used to attack Ubiquit and one used to create Sharp’s PayPal account.

The real kicker is that when his home internet briefly went down, so too did the VPN, and his real IP showed up as connecting to the previously mentioned workplace Github account.

From bad, to worse, to even worse than that

A visit from law enforcement might deter most people from further antics. If it were me, I’d cut my losses and keep a very low profile. However, this story was made for further antics. The Department of Justice claims the alleged perpetrator posed as a company whistleblower after the FBI had searched his home. This “whistleblower” routine took the form of stories potentially damaging to the Ubiquiti Networks organisation.

This is, frankly, an astonishing chain of events. Especially considering this hack had such a big impact on stock. It remains to be seen what, exactly, would drive someone to this sort of self-destructive cavalcade of disaster. For now, you’ll have to make do with the indictment (PDF).

When insiders attack

We’ve talked about the harms caused by insider threats many times on this blog. Problems can arise from disgruntled employees who’ve gone past the point of no return with scores to settle. Ex-employees who didn’t have their access to systems revoked can be a problem. Even the humble printer can become a battleground for keeping certain types of special paper out of easy reach. Even the FBI aren’t safe from such events.

It’s not possible to eliminate this issue completely, unfortunately. On the bright side, we can see that even in a case as severe as the Ubiquiti attack, the long arm of the law can catch up with criminals eventually—no matter how well prepared they think they are.

The post Attacker unmasked by VPN flubs charged with Ubiquiti hack appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

This blog post was authored by Hossein Jazi and the Threat Intelligence Team.

Last week, Facebook announced that back in August it had taken action against a Pakistani APT group known as SideCopy. Facebook describes how the threat actors used romantic lures to compromise targets in Afghanistan.

In this blog post we are providing additional details about SideCopy that have not been published before. We were able to have unique insights about victims and targeted countries as well as the kind of data the APT group was able to successfully exfiltrate. Among the information that was stolen is access to government portals, Facebook, Twitter and Google credentials, banking information, and password-protected documents.

In addition, we detail how this threat actor had started to use new initial infection vectors for its operations which include Microsoft Publisher documents and Trojanized applications. Finally, we detail a newly-observed stealer that has been used by this actor called AuTo stealer.

Newly observed lures

The SideCopy APT is a Pakistani threat actor that has been operating since at least 2019, mainly targeting South Asian countries and more specifically India and Afghanistan. Its name comes from its infection chain that tries to mimic that of the SideWinder APT. It has been reported that this actor has similarities with Transparent Tribe (APT36) and possibly is a subdivision of this actor. Cisco Talos and Seqrite have provided comprehensive reports on this actor’s activities.

The lures used by SideCopy APT are usually archive files that have embedded one of these files: Lnk, Microsoft Publisher or Trojanized Applications. These lures can be categorized into two main groups:

• Targeted lures: These lures are specially crafted and designed to target specific victims. We believe this category is very well customized to target government or military officials. Here some of the examples:
  • Report-to-NSA-Mohib-Meeting-with-FR-GE-UK.zip:
    This archive file contains a Microsoft Publisher document that is a letter from “Mr Ahmad Shuja Jamal, former DG for International Relations and Regional Cooperation at the National Security Council of Afghanistan” to “Hamdullah Mohib, former National Security Adviser of Afghanistan”. This letter is about a “meeting with representatives of France and UK delegations of Afghanistan”. Most likely this lure has been used to target Afghanistan government officials and especially foreign affair related officials.
  • address-list-ere-update-sep-2021.zip: This archive file contains a malicious lnk file which loads a decoy PDF file. The decoy PDF file is: “Email facility address list of the ERE units: 20 Sept 2021”. This lure seems to be used to target the Indian Army and National Cadet Corps of India.
  • NCERT-NCF-LTV-Vislzr-2022.zip: Similar to the previous one, this includes a malicious lnk that loads a decoy PDF file. The decoy is a curriculum of the course named “Living the values, a value-narrative to grass-root leadership” offered by NCERT (National Council of Educational Research and Training of India).

• Generic lures: These lures are mostly generic and most likely have been used in spam campaigns to collect emails and credentials to help the actor perform their targeted attacks. In this category we observed the following: (The first three lures are the ones reported as “romantic lures” in a Facebook report)
  • Using girl names as the archive file name such as “nisha.zip“: (showing girl pictures with an application) These archive files contain a list of images with the “.3d” extension and an application named “3Dviewer.exe” that needs to to be executed to load and view images. In fact, the executable is Trojanized and will contact the actor servers to download the malicious payloads.
  • “image-random number.zip“: These zip files contains a malicious lnk file that shows a girl picture as a decoy.
  • “Whatsapp-image-random number.zip“: These zip files contain a malicious lnk file that shows a girl picture as a decoy.
  • “schengen_visa_application_form_english.zip“: This archive file contains a Microsoft Publisher document that loads a Schengen Visa Application Form in English as decoy. This is used to target people who want to travel to European countries.
  • “Download-Maria-Gul-CV.zip“: This archive contains a lnk that loads a resume as decoy. The name of the archive file usually is in this pattern “Download-Name-FamilyName-CV.zip”
  • “New document.zip“: This loads a document as decoy. We were not able to retrieve the lure in this case.

Victimology

As previously reported, the SideCopy APT has mainly targeted defense and armed forces personnel in the Indian subcontinent but there are not many reports about how successful these attacks were and what data was exfiltrated. The Malwarebytes Threat Intelligence team was able to identify some of the successful attacks operated by this APT. It is worth noting that those compromises happened before the Taliban completely took over Afghanistan. In fact, Facebook’s intervention in August matches with the timeline of indicators we recorded.

• Administration Office of the President (AOP) of Afghanistan personnel: This actor has operated targeted spear phishing attacks on members of AOP and was able to gain access to ten of them and steal their credentials from different government services such as mis.aop.gov.af, internal service, bank services (Maiwand Bank) and personal accounts such as Google, Twitter and Facebook.
• Ministry of Foreign affairs- Afghanistan: We have evidence that the actor infected one of the members of the Ministry of External affairs but it seems they were not able to collect any data from this victim.
• Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan: The actor infected two members of MOF but mostly they were able to collect personal accounts such as Google and Facebook and Bank accounts (“worldbankgroup.csod.com”). They also exfiltrated documents that are password protected.
• Afghanistan’s National Procurement Authority (NPA): The actor infected one person in NPA and were able to stead personal credentials including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Pinterest, Google and the mis.aop.gov.af account.
• A shared computer, India: It seems the actor gained access to a shared machine and collected a lot of credentials from government and eduction services. It seems this machine has been infected using one of the generic lures.

The SideCopy APT was able to steal several Office documents and databases associated with the Government of Afghanistan. As an example, the threat actor exfiltrated Diplomatic Visa and Diplomatic ID cards from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan database, as well as the Asset Registration and Verification Authority database belonging to the General Director of Administrative Affairs of Government of Afghanistan. They also were able to exfiltrate the ID cards of several Afghani government officials.

The exfiltrated documents contain names, numbers and email addresses associated with government officials. It is possible that they have been already targeted by the actor or will be the future targets of this actor. There are also some confidential letters that we think the actor is planning to use for future lures.

Attacker infrastructure

We have uncovered the main command and control (C2) server used by the attacker to monitor and control their victims. Each archive file that is used by the attacker to send to victims is considered a unique package and each package has its own payloads including hta and executables that usually are hosted on compromised domains. The actor has a system named “Scout” to monitor each package. The Scout system has four users with English nicknames (Hendrick, Alexander, Hookes, Malone). It also defines teams that are responsible to manage each package.

In this system, they have a dashboard that shows all the infected machines. Each row in the dashboard shows one package and its statistics which includes the IP address of the victim, package name, OS version, User-Agent, browser information, country and victim status.

The actor uses a different dashboard called Crusader to monitor the Action RAT statistics.

Analysis of the new attacks

As we mentioned earlier, the actor has used three different methods as its initial infection vector: lnk files, Microsoft Publisher files and Trojanized application. The lnk files have been well studied and what we have observed is very similar to what already has been reported, with only small changes. For example, we observed that they have updated the code of hta.dll and preBotHta.dll and added some more features.

In this section we provide the analysis for the other two variants: Microsoft Publisher and Trojanized Applications.

Microsoft Office Publisher

In this variant, attackers have embedded a Microsoft Office Publisher document in an archive file. We’ve identified two variants of the Office publisher documents:

• Report to NSA Mohib – Meeting with FR, GE, UK – 12 Nov 2020.docx.pub
• schengen_visa_application_form_english.pub

Both of these documents were created in August 2021 and we believe they have been used in the most recent campaign. Both of these documents contains a simple macro that calls Shell function to call mshta.exe to download and execute a specified hta file.

The hta file loads the loader DLL (PreBotHta.dll) into memory and then collects AV product names. The AV name along with the encoded payloads that need to be loaded by this loader are passed to the PinkAgain function.

The loader is responsible for dropping both credwiz.exe and Duser.dll. Unlike what has been reported, in this case Duser.dll is not copied into different locations based on AV products and it is copied into C:ProgramDataShareIt for all AV products.

This loader just does some additional work based on the AV product. For example if the AV product is Avira it tries to download and execute an additional hta file to deploy additional payloads.

After dropping the required files onto the victim, it starts the “credwiz.exe” process. This executable sideloads the malicious payload “Duser.dll”. This payload has been written in Delphi (this is the Delphi variant of Action Rat) and compiled on October 2 2021.

All the commands, strings and domains in this RAT are base64 encoded. The malicious process starts by collecting hostname, username, OS version, OS architecture, Mac address and installed AV products (by executing cmd.exe WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\rootSecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List) from the victim and sending them to the command and control server using a HTTP request ("https://afrepublic.xyz/classification/classification.php").
It then goes into a loop and waits for commands from the server to execute them. This RAT has the capability to execute one of the following commands:

• Command: Execute commands received from the server
• Download: Download additional payloads
• Drives: Get drive info
• GetFiles: Get files info
• Execute: Execute a specified payload using CreateProcessW
• Upload: Upload files to server

After execution of each command it reports back the result to its server. The reporting url is different than the C2 url. The report type depends on the command, for example if the payload executes a command, it reports the following information to the server: Victim’s ID, the executed command, the command output and the error message if the command execution was not successful.

Trojanized Image Viewer Application (3DViewer.exe)

In this variant, the attacker has distributed an archive file including an application named 3Dviewer.exe and a set of images with “3d” extension that can be only opened by that executable.

It seems the attacker Trojanized an image viewer application named “3Dviewer” to download and execute a malicious HTA file using Mshta in addition to its normal function that can load and show the pictures. This executable has been compiled on October 26 2021. The rest of the process is similar to what we described in the previous section.

AuTo Stealer

We also came across another Stealer used by this actor that has been written in C++. To the best of our knowledge this is a new Stealer used by SideCopy APT. A Loader has been used to drop and load an executable (credbiz.exe) that side loads the Stealer. We were able to identify two different variants of this Loader that have been used to load an HTTP version and TCP version of the Stealer. Both of these loaders and the Stealer components have been compiled on October 30 2021:

Loader

Based on the functionality, we can say this Loader is a C++ variant of PreBotHta.dll (C# Loader used to load other Rats used by this actor). This Loader is responsible for dropping the following files in C:ProgramDataOracle directory:

• credwiz.exe executable and rename it as credbiz.exe.
• TextShaping.dll (Stealer component that will be side loaded by credbiz.exe)

Similar to PreBotHta.Dll, it checks the installed AV product on the victim’s machine and performs additional actions based on the AV product name. For example if the AV is Avast, Avira, BitDefender or AVG it creates a batch file (sysboot.bat) and executes it by calling cmd.exe. This makes credbiz.exe persistence through the AutoRun registry key. If the installed AV is one of the Kaspersky, Symantec, Mcafee or QuickHeal it creates an lnk file (Win Setting Loader.lnk) for persistency in StartUp directory.

After performing the additional process, it executes credbiz.exe by calling CreateProcessW.

TextShaping.dll (Stealer component)

The actor used two different variants of the Stealer Stealer: HTTP and TCP. The HTTP version performs the exfiltration over HTTP while the TCP variant performs all the exfiltration over TCP. This component also has an interesting unique PDB path: "D:Project AlphaHTTP AutoappReleaseapp.pdb"

This Stealer collects PowerPoint, Word, Excel and PDF documents, text files, database files and images and exfiltrates them to its server over HTTP or TCP. To exfiltrate the data using HTTP, it builds a request that is specific to data files being exfiltrated and sends them over an HTTP server. For example, when it wants to exfiltrate PowerPoint documents it builds the following request and sends them over HTTP:
http://newsroom247.xyz:8080/streamppt?HostName_UserName

For other file types it adds the /stream related to the file type and exfiltrates them to server. Here are the list of them: /streamppt, /streamdoc, /streamxls, /streamdb, /streamtxt, /streampdf, /streamimg.

Before starting the stealing process, it collects the victim’s information including username, hostname, OS info and AV products and sends them to its server by adding “user_details” to the domain. Also, it collects file information from the victim’s machine and stores it in a file “Hostname_UserName.txt” and sends the file by using the “logs_receiver” command.

Conclusion

The SideCopy APT has been actively targeting government and military officials in South Asia. The group mainly uses archived files to target victims in spam or spear phishing campaigns. The archive files usually have an embedded lnk, Office or Trojanized application that are used to call mshta to download and execute an hta file. The hta files perform fileless payload execution to deploy one of the RATs associated with this actor such as AllaKore or Action Rat. Malwarebytes products can identify the initial infection vectors used by SideCopy and block them from execution.

IOCs

Mitre attack techniques

The post SideCopy APT: Connecting lures to victims, payloads to infrastructure appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

As reported by Cryptolaemus on Twitter, and demonstrated step by step by BleepingComputer, Emotet is now being distributed through malicious Windows App Installer packages that pretend to be Adobe PDF software.

How does the attack work?

To understand what Microsoft is supposed to do about this method, we need to look at how these attacks work. URLs are sent out to victims by using malspam. The emails are sent to appear as replies to existing conversations by using stolen reply-chain emails. In the email they ask the receiver to look at an attachment. Clicking the link brings the victim to a fake Google Drive page that prompts them to click a button to preview the PDF document.

If you use the “Preview PDF” button it triggers an ms-appinstaller URL that attempts to open a file with an  .appinstaller extension hosted on Microsoft Azure using URLs at *.web.core.windows.net. Appinstaller files mostly belong to App Installer by Microsoft. An .appinstaller file helps if you need multiple users to deploy your MSIX installation file. This is an XML file that you can create yourself or create, for example by using Visual Studio. The .appinstaller file specifies where your app is located and how to update it.

When attempting to open an .appinstaller file, the Windows browser will prompt if you wish to open the Windows App Installer program to proceed. In this case, once you agree, you will be shown an App Installer window prompting you to install the “Adobe PDF Component.” This malicious package looks like a legitimate Adobe application, as it has a legitimate Adobe PDF icon, a valid certificate which marks it as a ‘Trusted App’, and fake publisher information.

If a user chooses to proceed with the install—and why would they stop this far down the rabbit hole?—App Installer will download and install the malicious appxbundle hosted on Microsoft Azure. This bundle drops a .dll on the affected system and creates a startup entry for this .dll. This startup entry will automatically launch the DLL when a user logs into Windows. At that point you are infected with Emotet.

Hosting malicious files on Azure

Microsoft’s Azure cloud services have become an attractive option for cybercriminals to store malicious content. Not just for malicious files as in the case of Emotet, but also for phishing sites, other fraudulent sites, and command and control servers. Azure is certainly not alone, other content hosting sites like Google Drive, Dropbox, and Amazon’s web services are also abused to store malicious content. But critics are hard on Microsoft since it consider itself a security vendor. By the time of writing, the .appinstaller file was removed, but it was available for download longer than it should have been.

While we understand how difficult it is to inspect everything that gets uploaded into your cloud service, and that you can’t study every new customer under a microscope, we also do not know how much time passed between the first report of this new Emotet distribution method and the actual takedown.

Microsoft is receiving flack because it is its cloud service hosting malware, its app installer is used in the process, and its Operating System (Windows) is the target of the attacks. Does that make it an enabler? Not really and certainly not voluntarily.

Emotet

While we all thought and hoped that Emotet had kicked the bucket, it made a dramatic comeback a few weeks ago. And using new distribution methods is a clear sign that it is serious about the comeback.

So, don’t click those links, even if the URL looks trustworthy, the file icon looks legit, and the file is signed. Check with the alleged sender about whether the message really comes from them and is intended for you.

Stay safe, everyone!

The post Emotet being spread via malicious Windows App Installer packages appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Not every secure messaging app is as safe as it would like us to think. And some are safer than others.

A recently disclosed FBI training document shows how much access to the content of encrypted messages from secure messaging services US law enforcement can gain and what they can learn about your usage of the apps.

The infographic shows details about iMessage, Line, Signal, Telegram, Threema, Viber, WeChat, WhatsApp, and Wickr. All of them are messaging apps that promise end-to-end encryption for their users. And while the FBI document does not say this isn’t true, it reveals what type of information law enforcement will be able to unearth from each of the listed services.

Note: A pen register is an electronic tool that can be used to capture data regarding all telephone numbers that are dialed from a specific phone line. So if you see that mentioned below it refers to the FBI’s ability to find out who you have been communicating with.

iMessage

iMessage is Apple’s instant messaging service. It works across Macs, iPhones, and iPads. Using it on Android is hard because Apple uses a special end-to-end encryption system in iMessage that secures the messages from the device they’re sent on, through Apple’s servers, to the device receiving them. Because the messages are encrypted, the iMessage network is only usable by devices that know how to decrypt the messages. Here’s what the document says it can access for iMessage:

• Message content limited.
• Subpoena: Can render basic subscriber information.
• 18 USC §2703(d): Can render 25 days of iMessage lookups and from a target number.
• Pen Register: No capability.
• Search Warrant: Can render backups of a target device; if target uses iCloud backup, the encryption keys should also be provided with content return. Can also acquire iMessages from iCloud returns if target has enabled Messages in iCloud.

Line

Line is a freeware app for instant communications on electronic devices such as smartphones, tablets, and personal computers. In July 2016, Line Corporation turned on end-to-end encryption by default for all Line users, after it had earlier been available as an opt-in feature since October 2015. The document notes on Line:

• Message content limited.
• Suspect’s and/or victim’s registered information (profile image, display name, email address, phone number, LINE ID, date of registration, etc.)
• Information on usage.
• Maximum of seven days’ worth of specified users’ text chats (Only when end-to-end encryption has not been elected and applied and only when receiving an effective warrant; however, video, picture, files, location, phone call audio and other such data will not be disclosed).

Signal

Signal is a cross-platform centralized encrypted instant messaging service. Users can send one-to-one and group messages, which can include files, voice notes, images and videos. Signal uses standard cellular telephone numbers as identifiers and secures all communications to other Signal users with end-to-end encryption. The apps include mechanisms by which users can independently verify the identity of their contacts and the integrity of the data channel. The document notes about Signal:

• No message content.
• Date and time a user registered.
• Last date of a user’s connectivity to the service.

This seems to be consistent with Signal’s claims.

Telegram

Telegram is a freeware, cross-platform, cloud-based instant messaging (IM) system. The service also provides end-to-end encrypted video calling, VoIP, file sharing and several other features. There are also two official Telegram web twin apps—WebK and WebZ—and numerous unofficial clients that make use of Telegram’s protocol. The FBI document says about Telegram:

• No message content.
• No contact information provided for law enforcement to pursue a court order. As per Telegram’s privacy statement, for confirmed terrorist investigations, Telegram may disclose IP and phone number to relevant authorities.

Threema

Threema is an end-to-end encrypted mobile messaging app. Unlike other apps, it doesn’t require you to enter an email address or phone number to create an account. A user’s contacts and messages are stored locally, on each user’s device, instead of on the server. Likewise, your public keys reside on devices instead of the central servers. Threema uses the open-source library NaCl for encryption. The FBI document says it can access:

• No message content.
• Hash of phone number and email address, if provided by user.
• Push Token, if push service is used.
• Public Key
• Date (no time) of Threema ID creation.
• Date (no time) of last login.

Viber

Viber is a cross-platform messaging app that lets you send text messages, and make phone and video calls. Viber’s core features are secured with end-to-end encryption: calls, one-on-one messages, group messages, media sharing and secondary devices. This means that the encryption keys are stored only on the clients themselves and no one, not even Viber itself, has access to them. The FBI notes:

• No message content.
• Provides account (i.e. phone number)) registration data and IP address at time of creation.
• Message history: time, date, source number, and destination number.

WeChat

WeChat is a Chinese multi-purpose instant messaging, social media and mobile payment app. User activity on WeChat has been known to be analyzed, tracked and shared with Chinese authorities upon request as part of the mass surveillance network in China. WeChat uses symmetric AES encryption but does not use end-to-end encryption to encrypt users messages. The FBI has less access than the Chinese authorities and can access:

• No message content.
• Accepts account preservation letters and subpoenas, but cannot provide records for accounts created in China.
• For non-China accounts, they can provide basic information (name, phone number, email, IP address), which is retained for as long as the account is active.

WhatsApp

WhatsApp, is an American, freeware, cross-platform centralized instant messaging and VoIP service owned by Meta Platforms. It allows users to send text messages and voice messages, make voice and video calls, and share images, documents, user locations, and other content. WhatsApp’s end-to-end encryption is used when you message another person using WhatsApp Messenger. The FBI notes:

• Message content limited.
• Subpoena: Can render basic subscriber records.
• Court order: Subpoena return as well as information like blocked users.
• Search warrant: Provides address book contacts and WhatsApp users who have the target in their address book contacts.
• Pen register: Sent every 15 minutes, provides source and destination for each message.
• If target is using an iPhone and iCloud backups enabled, iCloud returns may contain WhatsApp data, to include message content.

Wickr

Wickr has developed several secure messaging apps based on different customer needs: Wickr Me, Wickr Pro, Wickr RAM, and Wickr Enterprise. The Wickr instant messaging apps allow users to exchange end-to-end encrypted and content-expiring messages, including photos, videos, and file attachments. Wickr was founded in 2012 by a group of security experts and privacy advocates but was acquired by Amazon Web Services. The FBI notes:

• No message content.
• Date and time account created.
• Type of device(s) app installed on.
• Date of last use.
• Number of messages.
• Number of external IDs (email addresses and phone numbers) connected to the account, bot not to plaintext external IDs themselves.
• Avatar image.
• Limited records of recent changes to account setting such as adding or suspending a device (does not include message content or routing and delivery information).
• Wickr version number.

Conclusion

If there is one thing clear from the information in this document it’s that most, if not all, of your messages are safe from prying eyes in these apps, unless you’re using WeChat in China. Based on the descriptions, you can check out which apps are available on your favorite platform and which of the bullet points are relevant to you, to decide which app is a good choice for you.

The safest way however is to make sure the FBI doesn’t consider you a person of interest. In those cases even using a special encrypted device can pose some risks.

Stay safe, everyone!

The post Here’s what data the FBI can get from WhatsApp, iMessage, Signal, Telegram, and more appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Some of my favourite retro video games are making waves on Steam, but not in the way you might think. Classics such as Strider, Ghosts n’ Goblins, and more are all available as content for Capcom Arcade Stadium. This is an emulator which lets you play 31 arcade games from the 80s/90s. The games themselves are paid downloadable content, but the main emulator download itself is free. It also comes with one free game as a taster of the full edition.

It didn’t have a great reception at launch, because people didn’t like titles being sold in bundles only. As such, it was something of a surprise to see it riding high at the top end of the Steam activity charts in the last few days.

Sure, the games can now be bought individually. But would that really equate to an all-time concurrent tally of 481,088 players? Did people really wake up this week and think “What we need in our lives is 3 different versions of Street Fighter 2”?

The numbers game

Make no mistake, these are some of the biggest numbers you can achieve on Steam and it typically requires a massive AAA+ title to achieve it. For example, right now the three top played games on Steam are:

1. Counter Strike: Global Offensive with 507,995 players
2. Dota 2 with 325,679 players
3. PUBG: Battlegrounds with 150,498 players

These are all huge online games, played against other people. Yet somehow we have the archaic arcade emulator, with its one free game by default, storming into the top three.

These numbers are so vast, Capcom Arcade Station has managed to hit 8th place in the top records for most simultaneous players. What could have possibly caused this? The faithful translation of arcade controls to gamepads? The ability to rewind the game should you make a mistake? Customising the individual game’s arcade cabinet before loading up a title?

Nope, it’s bots.

How did bots cause the great player count inflation of 2021?

Generally when we talk about bots in gaming, we mean hacked accounts or PCs performing certain tasks. It could be a DDoS attack, or sending out phishing messages inside game chat, or some other nefarious activity.

In this case, the “bot” is something a little bit different. It’s not something caused by what happens inside the game itself. Rather, it’s a layer of virtual economy and digital goods driving what happens to the player count.

Before we get to the nitty gritty, it’s time to explain the ins and outs of Steam card trading.

Steam card trading

Sometimes folks get confused on this, so for clarity, there’s two types of “Steam card”. The first is an actual, physical gift card you can buy in stores. These cards have monetary amounts assigned to them, and they’re a way to preload your Steam account with credit. You then use it to purchase games from the store. You can also buy “digital” versions of these cards which perform the same function.

The other type of card, the one we’re focusing on, are Steam trading cards. These are items which are tied to certain games, but don’t exist within them. They’re essentially cool looking virtual cards with characters from the game on them. The more you play a game, the more likely the chance you’ll be given a free card drop. When you collect all of the cards for a game, you can create a badge for your Steam profile. At the same time, you’ll be given other community-centric items like emoticons, the possibility of discount coupons for other games, or even the option to bump up your Steam level (another profile feature).

The system is designed so you can’t just grab all of the cards by playing. There’s a limit on how many you’ll receive and then you need to get the rest by trading with friends, or buying from the Steam marketplace.

This is a very detailed system with a lot of depth to it. Steam trading is big business, and often one of the focal points for scams, phishes, and malware antics. However, that’s not the case here.

Rather, it appears to be users trying to game the system for their own ends. For once, nobody is compromising accounts and running off with a sack full of stolen logins.

Still, this begs the question: what is happening here?

The wonderful world of card mining

It’s not just Bitcoin hogging all the space in the mines these days. Steam cards can also be mined, and there’s a surprising number of tools available to do it. One of the most popular is something called ArchiSteamFarm. This is a third party tool you can log into with your Steam credentials, and it’ll tell you what can/can’t be farmed. If there are card drops available, you simply tell it which games of yours to “idle” on and we’re off to the card mining races. You don’t have to download the game in order to idle, which makes it super convenient for people wanting cards without gigabytes of downloads and wasted hard drive space.

This is where things get really interesting.

Steam cards usually only drop for paid titles. If you don’t buy the game, you can’t get cards. In this case, the base Capcom Arcade Simulator game is a free download with one free title included. This isn’t (and shouldn’t!) be enough to have cards start dropping.

However, something seems to have gone wrong. All of a sudden, people found they could obtain trading cards despite only having the free game. This meant a huge surge in botting activity to grab cards before someone at Valve—the company behind Steam—fixed it.

As a result, a massive amount of card miners fired up their tools (whether ArchiSteamFarm or something else entirely), and idled their way to sweet card victory. As above, there’s limitations on how many cards you can farm. Once you hit the limit, that’s it – no more mining on that game ever. You have to trade or buy the rest. So this is, essentially, people just wanting to get in on the ground floor of red hot card trading action.

Watching Steam achievement totals drop in real time

As this Ars Technica article notes, you can observe clues regarding the automated action taking place. One way to do this is by checking out Steam achievement numbers. Around 44.6% of people had gained the achievement for loading up a game for the first time a couple of days ago. Now, the number sits at just 7.9%. That’s lower than the previous figure in the article. The only way this number makes sense given the massive user numbers is if huge amounts of new game owners are using tools to “idle” while prospecting for card drops.

The leaky card pipeline has apparently been fixed, so no amount of idling will produce any more cards. This happens to games occasionally, most notably when an error caused card drops for Life is Strange 2. What usually happens after an incident like this is the market is flooded and card value plummets, so it’s probably a fraught time on the old trading card stock exchange or something.

When retro revivals are no more…

Unfortunately my dreams of a Strider revival off the back of massive player numbers and a sudden boom in retro gaming now seems unlikely. On the bright side, the peculiar rise in player numbers didn’t involve people up to no good with malware or phishing.

While Valve probably won’t be too pleased by the inadvertent rush on cards, that is at least one small mercy we can be thankful for.

The post Capcom Arcade Stadium’s record player numbers blamed on card mining appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Windows 11 is experiencing an apparent lack of uptake among Windows users. If this survey is accurate, less than 1% of 10 million PCs surveyed are running the new operating system. In fact, more machines are using Windows XP.

That may surprise you. It might even seem like a bit of an embarrassing failure for Microsoft. However, the low numbers could well be a very good thing overall. It was always going to be a slow uptake, and we’re going to look at some of the reasons why.

Low numbers are to be expected – and that’s fine

There are quite a few barriers to entry for anyone looking to upgrade to Windows 11. In fact, it’s not just businesses facing Windows headaches. It’s home users too, but perhaps for somewhat different reasons.

1. Old apps: A big reason ancient operating systems like XP still run in organisations is down to old, business critical apps. For most businesses, no one size fits all solution exists. Some of the tech will be outsourced. Bits of it will operate remotely, rather than in house. There’ll be bespoke applications made by someone who left the organisation 5 years ago. Most folks won’t know how it operates, just how to patch it if something goes wrong. Pulling it out will break lots of business critical systems, and there’s no guarantee a replacement will work. Oh, and by the way: it only runs on Windows XP. That’s how you end up with XP and other old operating systems all over the place. They’ve carved their tiny niche, and almost nothing will dislodge them.
2. Strict requirements and confusing messaging: This boils down to TPM, or Trusted Platform Module. Microsoft made this a requirement to install the newer operating system. It’s an additional security feature which helps keep bad people away from your data. Unfortunately, initial descriptions of TPM were somewhat confusing. The continued state of malaise over TPM is likely keeping folks away from Windows 11 for the time being. Even now, it’s tricky to find people who make business decisions on tech who are familiar with the issue, and have the required equipment to run Windows 11 the way it’s supposed to be run.
3. Gaming headaches: Many home users have avoided Windows 11 because of the potential impact on gaming performance. People don’t generally want to spend thousands on gaming rigs, then find their expensive graphics card is suddenly underperforming. If they’re running mid-range or cheap cards, they’re probably even more likely to say no. There’s definitely an air of “wait and see” where this is concerned. Nobody wants to mess up their pre-loaded Windows 10 box with a failed 11 upgrade. Folks who built their machines from scratch will probably want to stay with Windows 10 for the time being too. It’s just too much of a leap in the dark at the moment.

These are the main points, but we can think of some more.

Windows 10: ageing like a fine wine

Do people actually need to suddenly jump into Windows 11? What’s the compelling reason for doing so? It seems very likely that for most people, there just isn’t one. Yet.

I often use Windows 10. I’m fine with it, after a few false starts at the beginning. The handful of alterations to core functionality and usability that I’ve heard about, aren’t things I’m particularly interested in. They’re not deal-breakers, but I just wonder “Why bother? This works fine.”

Does Microsoft want people to adopt quickly?

I think we forget that Windows 10 has already been around for 6 years. It’s not a new thing anymore! Microsoft is entirely happy to keep Windows 10 chugging along. Support for it won’t end until October 14, 2025. That’s four more years of Windows 10 action, and it’ll still be used for some time after that. By that point, some of the more peculiar quirks will have been ironed out. Businesses will have a better feel for it.

If we’re lucky, the TPM hardware issues won’t be as big a concern. Some orgs may even have figured out how to update that in-house app from XP to 11 (they will not). And hey, you can always pay for patches on End of Life operating systems, should you really want to.

It seems, on balance, that it’s better to have the rollout happen slowly. Network admins have enough security concerns to worry about. Do they really need to hurl the shiny new Windows 11 into the network and juggle that responsibility too? The numbers seem to suggest not, and it’s possible Microsoft is also happy with this approach.

Whatever your decision, we wish you well in the upgrade struggles to come.

The post Most people aren’t upgrading to Windows 11: Not the end of the world appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Security researchers have discovered banking Trojan apps on the Google Play Store, and say they have been downloaded by more than 300,000 Android users.

As you may know, banking Trojans are kitted for stealing banking data like your username and password, and two-factor authentication (2FA) codes that you use to login to your bank account. They also capable of stealing phone keystrokes, and taking screenshots of what you’re seeing on your phone as you use it. All these are done without the victim’s consent and without them noticing anything until it’s too late.

The particular malicious apps the ThreatFabric researchers found were disguised to look like apps that an Android user might normally search for, such as QR scanners, PDF scanners, cryptocurrency wallets, and fitness monitors. Knowing that a portion of Android users are aware that the Play Store often gets malware—thus are quite wary about what they download—these apps actually come with the functions they advertised, further alleviating any doubts in users minds about their legitimacy.

But, as users will soon realize, looking and acting (or sounding) like something they are expected to look and act like are only limited to ducks, as these apps begin to show their true intent after they have been installed.

So, how do these benign apps become fully malicious? The cybercriminals behind them introduce malicious code as updates to the apps—slowly and surely. It’s a common evasion tactic which gets their malicious app into the Play Store without raising alarms at the door. Note, however, that these apps can only be manually updated to have the Trojan code should the attackers desire it.

So, the human element is now introduced in an Android attack chain. Obviously, the attackers have adapted this method from the ransomware playbook.

If ransomware attackers can handpick their targets and rummage through files within their compromised networks, these Android attackers can handpick devices “infected” with their apps and manually start the download of the Trojan code in a specific region of the world. To illustrate, let’s say “Fitness App Alpha” is installed in one device in California, USA and one in Montreal, Canada. Bad Guy flicks the switch to have Trojan code downloaded into “Fitness App Alpha” in California. This means that “Fitness App Alpha” in California is now Trojanized, while the one in Montreal is not.

According to ThreatFabric, filtering “makes automated detection a much harder strategy to adopt by any organization.”

Not only that, incrementally updating the app, location checking, and device checking are also methods that attackers use to ensure their app is running on actual Android devices and not on a security researcher’s testing environment.

“This incredible attention dedicated to evading unwanted attention renders automated malware detection less reliable,” the researchers further stated in their blog post. “Actors behind it took care of making their apps look legitimate and useful. There are large numbers of positive reviews for the apps. The number of installations and presence of reviews may convince Android users to install the app.”

In four months, four Android malware families have spread across the Google Play Store. They are Anatsa, Alien, Hydra, and Ermac. Their campaigns have fooled thousands of Android users, and we can only imagine how much they have already stolen from them until they were discovered and reported.

How to keep dodgy apps out of your phone

When looking for apps, make time to do your research. If you’re after, say, QR codes, searching for “the top QR codes” or “the best QR codes” may be a good start as there are dozens of articles on the internet about this very subject. If you trust the publisher of these articles, you can be assured that they have looked into these apps and tested these themselves before giving their recommendations.

Another way is to head straight to the Play Store and look for apps (a) with good reviews, (b) a large user base, and (c) that have been in the Play Store for quite some time now (at least 12 months). Be wary, of course, of reviews that could be fake. But if the app you want ticks most or all of the boxes I mentioned above, dig a little bit more deeper and find out what its problems are and why some users don’t like it.

You could also consider installing security software on your phone. We’d be remiss here if we didn’t mention that Malwarebytes has an Android product.

Lastly, now is probably a good time to also audit your apps and get rid of those that you no longer use or update. You’re safer this way, too.

The post Have you downloaded that Android malware from the Play Store lately? appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Life must be hard for companies that try to make a living by invading people’s privacy. You almost feel sorry for them. Except I don’t.

The UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)—an independent body set up to uphold information rights—has announced its provisional intent to impose a potential fine of just over £17 million (roughly US$23 million) on Clearview AI.

In addition, the ICO has issued a provisional notice to stop further processing of the personal data of people in the UK and delete what ClearviewAI has, following alleged serious breaches of the UK’s data protection laws.

What is Clearview AI?

Clearview AI was founded in 2017, and started to make waves when it turned out to have created a groundbreaking facial recognition app. You could take a picture of a person, upload it and get to see public photos of that person, along with links to where those photos appeared.

According to its own website, Clearview AI provides a “revolutionary intelligence platform”, powered by facial recognition technology. The platform includes a facial network of 10+ billion facial images scraped from the public internet, including news media, mugshot websites, public social media, and other open sources.

Yes, scraped from social media, which means that if you’re on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram or similar, then your face may well be in the database.

Clearview AI says it uses its faceprint database to help law enforcement fight crimes. Unfortunately it’s not just law enforcement. Journalists uncovered that Clearview AI also licensed the app to at least a handful of private companies for security purposes.

Clearview AI ran a free trial with several law enforcement agencies in the UK, but these trials have since been terminated, so there seems to be little reason for Clearview to hold on to the data.

And worried citizens that wish to have their data removed, which companies have to do upon request under the GDPR, are often required to provide the company with even more data, including photographs, to be considered for removal.

It’s not just the UK that’s worried. Earlier this month, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) ordered Clearview AI to stop collecting photos taken in Australia and remove the ones already in its collection.

Offenses

The ICO says that the images in Clearview AI’s database are likely to include the data of a substantial number of people from the UK and these may have been gathered without people’s knowledge from publicly available information online.

The ICO found that Clearview AI has failed to comply with UK data protection laws in several ways, including:

• Failing to process the information of people in the UK in a way they are likely to expect or that is fair
• Failing to have a process in place to stop the data being retained indefinitely
• Failing to have a lawful reason for collecting the information
• Failing to meet the higher data protection standards required for biometric data (classed as ‘special category data’ under the GDPR and UK GDPR)
• Failing to inform people in the UK about what is happening to their data
• And, as mentioned earlier, asking for additional personal information, including photos, which may have acted as a disincentive to individuals who wish to object to their data being processed

Clearview AI Inc now has the opportunity to make representations in respect of these alleged breaches set out in the Commissioner’s Notice of Intent and Preliminary Enforcement Notice. These representations will then be considered and a final decision will be made.

As a result, the proposed fine and preliminary enforcement notice may be subject to change or there will be no further formal action.

There is some hope for Clearview AI if you look at past fines imposed by the ICO.

Marriot was initially expected to receive a fine of 110 million Euros after a data breach that happened in 2014 but wasn’t disclosed until 2018, but Marriot ended up having to pay “only” 20 million Euros. We can expect to hear a final decision against Clearview AI by mid-2022.

Facial recognition

A facial recognition system is a technology capable of matching a human face from a digital image or a video frame against a database of faces, typically employed to identify and/or authenticate users.

Facial recognition technology has always been controversial. It makes people nervous about Big Brother. It has a tendency to deliver false matches for certain groups, like people of color. Police departments have had access to facial recognition tools for almost 20 years, but they have historically been limited to searching government-provided images, such as mugshots and driver’s license photos.

Gathering images from the public internet obviously makes for a much larger dataset, but it’s not the intention with which the images were posted.

It’s because of the privacy implications that some tech giants have backed away from the technology, or halted their development. Clearview AI clearly is not one of them. Neither a tech giant nor a company that cares about privacy.

The post Massive faceprint scraping company Clearview AI hauled over the coals appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.