IT News

This blog post was authored by Erika Noerenberg

Introduction

Over the past months, Malwarebytes researchers have been tracking a unique malspam campaign delivering the Remcos remote access trojan (RAT) via financially-themed emails. Remcos is often delivered via malicious documents or archive files containing scripts or executables. Like other RATs, Remcos gives the threat actor full control over the infected system and allows them to capture keystrokes, screenshots, credentials, or other sensitive system information. Unlike most RATs used by malicious actors however, Remcos is marketed as an administrative tool by the company Breaking Security which sells it openly on their website.

Distribution

Remcos often infects a system by embedding a specially-crafted settings file into an Office document, allowing an attacker to trick a user to run malicious code without additional notification. This variant of Remcos has been observed to be distributed via targeted spam emails with an attached archive file. The emails and attachment names have been primarily financially-themed; an example email is shown below:

For illustration, the following table lists a sample of email subjects and attachment names from 2021 by date:

In most Remcos spam campaigns, the payload is an executable contained in an attached archive (.zip) or disk image (.img) file, though malicious documents are also sometimes used. In this campaign however, the emails contain a zip archive containing a Visual Basic script (.vbs) which downloads and executes additional scripts and finally installs the Remcos payload.

*Eariler versions also included a “Property.hta” file which only comprised the VB script wrapped in HTML as seen below. Interestingly, the body of this HTML consisted only of the text “demo”, which indicates this might have been test code.

Analysis

Remcos is a fully-functioning RAT that gives the threat actor full control over the infected system and allows them to collect keystrokes, audio, video, screenshots, and system information. Because it has full control, Remcos is also able to download and execute additional software onto the system. This Remcos distribution utilizes a series of scripts that ultimately results in the injection of a Remcos payload into the Windows system binary aspnet_compiler.exe. A sample infection chain for this variant is shown below:

The samples analyzed below originate from the attachment Appraisalreportl1100788392210.zip (SHA256 4e712de8a3d602ccf55321a85701114c01f9731af356da05fb6e3881a13bb23e). As with all analyzed samples, the the infection chain followed the process flow above; the initial Visual Basic script initiates a series of download and execution of obfuscated scripts that eventually result in the injection of the final Remcos payload into aspnet_compiler.exe.

Although the script above is lengthy due to obfuscation, it ultimately amounts to the following simple powershell command which downloads and executes a second Visual Basic script:

The first downloaded script (ALL.TXT) also uses simple deobfuscation techniques to perform a few simple tasks. The $JUANADEARCO variable in this script contains Base64-encoded data which is decoded by the last line of the script (this data is shown as decoded in the highlighted box in the image below). This script performs the following actions:

• Creates the directory C:UsersPublicRun
• Downloads Run_02_02_02.TXT (saved as C:UsersPublicRunRun.vbs)
• Downloads Lerveri.txt (saved as UsersPublicRun—–Run+++++++++.ps1)
• Sets HKCU:SoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerUser Shell FoldersStartup to “C:UsersPublicRun”
• Sets HKCU:SoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerShell FoldersStartup to “C:UsersPublicRun”

The shell folder registry entries are legacy keys that are still existent for backwards compatibility. Setting the “Startup” value of these registry entries to the malware’s directory of execution effectively sets the contents of that directory to execute upon system startup, ensuring persistence.

Run.vbs is obfuscated in a similar fashion to the initial Visual Basic script:

This script (deobfuscated below) is responsible only for execution the main powershell script which contains embedded binaries, encoded in hex in plaintext.

One of the binaries encoded in —–Run+++++++++.ps1 is the Remcos payload which is loaded into the legitimate Windows binary aspnet_compiler.exe. The following function in the powershell script loads the Remcos PE into the binary:

Although all of the analyzed Remcos samples of this campaign since January 2021 call back to the same IP address and port, no actual C2 traffic has been observed. All of the script downloads have pointed to addresses on the legitimate website us.archive.org, and the payloads have connected (though only via TCP handshake) to the IP address 185.19.85[.]168 on port 8888.

Because this IP address has not changed over several months, we investigated the passive DNS records to see if the infrastructure may have been used in other recent attacks. We found that this IP address had the following resolutions over the last few months:

Examination of this IP address revealed several hosted services on multiple ports. The highlighted date range above is interesting as it appears to be a mail server, and Spamhaus Zen classifies this address as blocked due to spam. Furthermore, analysis also revealed that the #totalhash malware database contains malware associated with this address going back as far as 2013. Correlating additional malware associated with this address showed several other versions of Remcos samples connecting to the same IP (many to shugardaddy.ddns.net port 5946) – a few recent samples are shown below:

One identifying factor from this campaign is the use of us.archive.org to host payloads. Although this is not unique to malware campaigns in general, it is unique to the Remcos campaigns we have analyzed – only the VBS method of distribution has been observed to display this behavior.

In an analysis from Morphisec in March of this year, an HCrypt loader sample was analyzed that demonstrated a similar infection chain to the Remcos samples discussed above. Although the stages and scripts are not identical, the intermediary steps share a few similarities, such as the file names of the downloaded scripts ALL.txt, Server.txt, and in newer samples, Bypass.txt. The scripts also have a few function names in common, but the HCrypt samples have anti-analysis and anti-virus evasion functionality not seen in the Remcos samples. Further research is required to determine whether this set of scripts is a generically available package, or specific to a particular actor and being re-used across campaigns.

Although the actor or group behind this campaign is not known, the sporadic nature of the emails distributing this malware suggests that it could be targeted in nature. Remcos is a mature trojan that has evolved over many years; though the basic capabilities have remained the same, the methodologies of distribution and installation continue to change. Because it is software that can be purchased openly online, it is difficult to trace or attribute usage to a particular actor. However, given the consistency of network infrastructure and installation methodology, it is possible that the motivation or actors behind these attacks could be identified. Malwarebytes analysts continue to monitor and track this threat and will update detections and indicators as needed.

Protection

Malwarebytes protects users from Remcos by using real-time protection.

References

https://www.anomali.com/blog/threat-actors-use-msbuild-to-deliver-rats-filelessly

https://www.cybereason.com/blog/cybereason-exposes-malware-targeting-us-taxpayers

https://blog.morphisec.com/tracking-hcrypt-an-active-crypter-as-a-service

IOCs

Analyzed Samples:

Remcos VB Scripts:

Related Remcos Samples:

Other IOCs:

The post Remcos RAT delivered via Visual Basic appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Kaseya VSA included at least “seven or eight” privately known zero-day vulnerabilities before it suffered a widespread ransomware attack that impacted hundreds of businesses, said Victor Gevers, chair of the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure, or DIVD, a volunteer-run organization that found a remote code execution flaw in Kaseya VSA on April 1, 2021.

In speaking with Malwarebytes for its Lock and Code podcast (embedded below), Gevers revealed that Kaseya VSA’s vulnerabilities represent just one data point in a far larger and more worrying trend—that Internet-facing remote administration tools are rife with flaws and that, as organizations increasingly rely on such tools for working-from-home environments, cybercriminals will increasingly discover, target, and exploit those flaws.

“We are seeing these signals very clearly that the quality of products that are online and are exposed to the Internet are not up to par for the current situation that we are in,” Gevers said. “For attackers, this is the best way in—next to, of course, sending phishing emails. That will always exist because we cannot learn to stop [clicking on things]. But this second thing, this is going to screw us over in the long term.”

The ransomware attack against Kaseya VSA on July 2 has quickly become recognized as one of the most significant cyberattacks in recent history. In the attack, members of the REvil ransomware gang pushed malicious Kaseya VSA updates that locked up machines and networks after first disabling several protective features in Microsoft Defender, the default anti-malware software packaged with most Windows machines today. The impact of the attack, however, extended much further, because Kaseya VSA is one of the more popular remote monitoring and management tools used by Managed Service Providers. The MSPs that were hit by the attack saw not only their systems encrypted, but also the systems of the clients that they support.

Essentially, the attack cascaded down, first hitting Kaseya VSA users—MSPs—and then hitting the businesses that relied on those MSPs for day-to-day IT support.

Reportedly hundreds of businesses were hit. Schools in New Zealand warned their staff that their computers might be inaccessible. The Swedish grocery chain Coop closed roughly 500 stores for multiple days. Two small towns in Maryland saw their systems lock up. The scale helped prompt Kaseya’s CEO into publicly releasing a statement.

For Gevers, the number of victims is frustrating, largely because he and his team were working with Kaseya to patch the VSA vulnerabilities for months prior. Within a day of discovering a remote code execution vulnerability on April 1, DIVD built up a team to investigate further, Gevers said.

“We open a case, we get some other security engineers on board. If we can find a copy [of Kaseya VSA], then we get our own copy of it, a trial version to run. We set up a lab. Then we have to go through the process of creating a fingerprint, because we want to scan the entire Internet—we want to look to every web server in the world to have that specific fingerprint, so we know where those panels are, exactly,” Gevers said. “Within a day, we were able to scan all Internet-facing instances of that thing, and it took us two days to start identification of the possible victims that had the on-prem version.”

DIVD compiled a report that showed “all on-prem implementation[s],” along with unique customer ID codes, delivering the report to Kaseya on April 6, just days after first discovering the vulnerability.

Kaseya took responsibility for the vulnerability and began developing a patch, Gevers said, which DIVD helped test for effectiveness. During this time, DIVD was also offered a version of Kaseya VSA to test more extensively, and in those tests, Gevers said, a researcher found additional flaws.

“We finally had our version running in our test lab,” Gevers said. “This is how it went from one zero-day [to] seven or eight, eventually.”

While Kaseya managed to quickly test its patches on SaaS implementations of Kaseya VSA, it had more trouble with customers who still relied on the on-premises versions, Gevers said. But in the middle of that testing, it became too late:

“It took them quite a lot of effort and time, and more and more expertise to get the right patch out—to get it tested, to get it through quality assurance. And then, disaster struck.”

The fallout of the attack is both external and internal.

Internally, Gevers said that DIVD is already considering how to improve coordinated vulnerability disclosure—as a process—because, despite issuing a confidential warning as far back as April 6, some systems remained vulnerable. While many potential victims were saved by DIVD and Kaseya’s months-long work, Gevers said he would have preferred to see no victims at all.

Externally—beyond the immediate damage of the ransomware attack itself—Gevers said that security administrators can no longer look away from a growing problem that affects the very tools they rely on every day.

“We understand that it is convenient to have your administrative panels, your RDP, your VNC, your shared hosting panels… all that kind of things for doing maintenance and administrative, to have it directly connected to the Internet, we understand,” Gevers said. “But it is simply not safe, because there is always, there is always an issue with the software.”

Critically, Gevers said that these flaws are neither isolated, or complex:

“This is not just to hit on Kaseya. With Vembu, it was the same. The latest Citrix bug, you know, that caused an outage. With Pulse VPN. I am sorry, but these vulnerabilities—these are not advanced. Not advanced at all.”

For Gevers, there is a clear path forward: Fix today’s vulnerabilities as soon as possible, and prevent future, similarly-flawed products from ever entering the market.

In the short term, Gevers called for more security volunteers. At DIVD, the team is too small and not geographically dispersed enough to handle worldwide cyberattacks. For instance, having a volunteer in Miami, Florida, near Kaseya’s headquarters, could have helped DIVD, Gevers said.

In the long term, Gevers stressed that software vendors take greater responsibility of their products. He asked vendors to invite third party reviewers to analyze software code, and to step away from meaningless marketing language. By giving consumers more information from trusted analysts about how a product performs and what vulnerabilities it may have, Gevers said the market will then hopefully reward secure, transparent software. Finally, Gevers said that countries around the world should better incentivize independent security research so that cybersecurity researchers do not feel intimidated or afraid to report their findings.

The future, Gevers said, is at stake:

“It’s our duty to do something to make sure that the Internet stays safe enough for the next generation… because we are always leaving the next generation with political challenges, challenges in society, environmental challenges, economical challenges. Can we please leave a communications network behind that I can still trust to work on?”

Listen to the full Lock and Code podcast, with host David Ruiz, below.

You can also find us on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and Google Podcasts, plus whatever preferred podcast platform you use.

The post “Seven or eight” zero-days: The failed race to fix Kaseya VSA, with Victor Gevers, Lock and Code S02E13 appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Scareware is a type of rogue program which has been around for many years, arguably dating back to 1990. It can be installed without permission, or via deception and false promises. Scareware is primarily used to panic or worry someone into performing a task they otherwise wouldn’t have done. There are some caveats to this, which we’ll cover below.

The rest of this article will reference scareware programs which are intended to be malicious. This means asking for payment, locking devices, or acting in a malware-like manner. Joke / trick programs need not apply (unless they’re also doing something malicious). There are, broadly, a number of different categories which various kinds of scareware fall into. Bogus web browser messages often assist shareware installations. As such, we’ll look at those too.

Examples of scareware

Fake security software

Predating ransomware, rogue scanners used to be a major plague on the security landscape and are still problematic to this day. At one point, you simply couldn’t move for bogus programs. The standard procedure was to warn of infections via browser popups, or hijacked surfing and pages you couldn’t navigate away from. Bogus security programs would run a fake scan, and warn of fake infections. They’d also ask for payment to “unlock” the full version of software so cleaning could take place.

Many types of fake security software imitate the design / name of real programs, in order to seem more convincing.

Scareware as a system menace

Many fake security tools do little beyond triggering aggravating popups or fake infection warnings. They “just” want you to hand over some money for a useless program. Others go further, acting the same way actual spy/malware does while simultaneously saying the PC has an infection (spoiler – it does, but not in the way victims might think). Rogues changing desktops with fake blue screen of death imagery, restarting when trying to uninstall scareware, disabling genuine security tools, and much more are par for the course in this realm.

Web browser lockers

Although not an install, browser lockers were an integral part of how scareware used to end up on systems in the first place. Typically, this involved a web page using code to prevent the user shutting the browser window (or tab, after tabs were introduced). Some browser lockers would make the browser go full screen (as if you’d pressed F11) and use “scare” tactics as the webpage background.

This commonly took the form of fake representations of people’s “This PC” section, complete with representation of C or D drives, generic folders like Music / Pictures and so on. As mentioned, others would display fake BSoD screens. Whatever it took to panic the viewer into downloading and purchasing offered software.

Scareware influence

Many of these techniques ended up making their way into the hands of malvertisers. In fact, it’s not unusual to see malvertisers directing device owners to scareware messaging. You’ll notice the product at the end of that particular chain isn’t fake security software offering a cleanup. It’s a VPN. There’s at least some folks out there who may think installing it may be enough to “fix” the fictitious virus infestations. That’s all it takes for some money to change hands.

How to prevent scareware

Many scareware experiences begin with bad browser experiences. It pays to have a fully updated browser at all times to reduce the risk of attack from exploits. Additional extensions like our Browser Guard will further lower the possibility of scare screens and fake messaging.

Dire warnings of multiple infections out of the blue are a big hint scareware is in the offing. So too are immediate demands for payment, popups which won’t go away, tabs which refuse to close. Pressure to make decisions right away “or else” are also a major red flag. Ad blockers will help reduce the possibility of redirects to scareware and malvertising from bad ads. Double win!

General awareness of common social engineering techniques will also help steer you away from panic-based decisions. While scareware isn’t the mainstream force it once was, it still has the capacity to shock the money from your bank account. Stay safe out there!

The post What is scareware? appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

A Virtual Private Network (VPN) can stop others from snooping on or tampering with your Internet traffic. It does this by concealing your traffic inside an encrypted tunnel between you and your VPN provider. And because your traffic appears to join the the Internet from your VPN provider’s computer and not your own, a VPN can also conceal your IP address, which disrupts tracking and helps you circumvent geo-blocks. At Malwarebytes, we have noticed an increase in VPN usage worldwide.

Despite its benefits, some people hesitate to use the technology because they believe VPNs negatively impact the performance of their Internet connection. So, does a VPN slow down Internet speeds?

Yes, it does. The encryption process, the distance to the server, and the VPN protocol your VPN uses can impact your Internet speed. But that isn’t the whole story.

What really matters is: Is that slowdown noticeable? A good VPN may slow down your Internet, but only to a negligible degree. Most customers of cutting-edge VPN services find that a slight performance hit is worth the benefits, if they notice it at all.

VPN speed test

The best way to check how much a VPN is slowing down your Internet connection is to perform a VPN speed test. A VPN speed test compares your regular Internet speed with your VPN speed. Your Internet bandwidth is usually measured in megabits per second (Mbps).

Here is a fast and easy way to perform a VPN speed test:

1. Deactivate your VPN.
2. Search your favorite search engine for “Internet speed test.”
3. Run an Internet speed test and note down your download and upload speeds.
4. Activate your VPN.
5. Connect to a VPN server.
6. Repeat step three and compare the results.

Bear in mind though, that you are not a machine and that what actually makes a difference to you is not the measurable lag in your Internet connection (known as latency) but how you perceive that lag (known as perceived latency). In many situations, you won’t notice a small slow down. In other situations, perhaps when you’re waiting on something important like a credit card transaction to complete, you will be more sensitive to changes in latency you normally wouldn’t notice.

So, while objective speed tests are a useful guide, there is no substitute for actually using a VPN in the real world and seeing how it affects things you care about.

How can I make my VPN faster than before?

Pick a different server

In general, the further your traffic has to travel to your VPN provider’s servers, the slower your VPN will be. Speed is also affected by how powerful those servers are, and how many people are using them at the same time, but all things being equal, distance matters.

Try picking a closer server to enjoy a faster connection. If it’s experiencing heavy traffic during peak hours, pick another server nearby to improve your Internet speed. It’s a good idea to subscribe to a VPN service that offers many servers across dozens of countries to have a fast connection.

Select a VPN that uses WireGuard

A VPN protocol is the set of instructions that establishes the way your data routes from your device to your VPN server. A VPN protocol impacts the speed, security, and stability of your connection. Many service providers have switched from OpenVPN to the WireGuard protocol because it’s secure, newer, and more efficient. In many studies, WireGuard is significantly faster than its competitors, including OpenVPN.

VPN speed boost

Some Internet Service Providers (ISPs) deliberately throttle your Internet speed during peak hours to reduce the server load by slowing down popular data packets. For example, Northeastern University and the University of Massachusetts Amherst found ISPs throttling streaming platforms like Netflix in their research. A top VPN service can help you bypass bandwidth throttling because it stops your ISP from examining data packets.

The post Does using a VPN slow down your Internet? appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

The US Department of State has announced that its Rewards for Justice (RFJ) program is now offering:

…up to $10 million for information leading to the identification or location of any person who, while acting at the direction or under the control of a foreign government, participates in malicious cyber activities against U.S. critical infrastructure in violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).

Ransomware

The reward is a clear sign that the Biden administration is increasing its efforts to disrupt state-sponsored cyberattacks, and to punish the criminals who launch them. The press release specifically calls out ransomware campaigns, saying that violations of the statute “may include transmitting extortion threats as part of ransomware attacks.”

Other violations of the CFAA that it mentions include:

• Intentional unauthorized access to a computer or exceeding authorized access and thereby obtaining information from any protected computer.
• Knowingly causing the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causing damage without authorization to a protected computer.

“Protected computers” includes US government and financial institution computer systems, and also those used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication.

Protecting whistle-blowers

To enable the reward system the RFJ has set up a Dark Web reporting channel. Exactly the same privacy-enhancing technology ransomware gangs use to conduct their ransom negotiations without being located or identified.

Some may be surprised at the size of the reward. One of the key reasons we have seen ransomware get progressively worse is that the spoils often outweigh the risks. With the $10 million reward the US is hoping to rebalance the equation. Cybercrime has become a mature industry, with different groups specializing in different parts of the value chain. That requires a level of trust to operate smoothly, and with this financial incentive, the US has just given everyone involved in the cybercrime industry a new and very significant reason to doubt the trustworthiness of their suppliers and affiliates. A method to divide and conquer if you will.

Russia

Even though the press release mentions “a foreign government” everybody will understand that this is mostly aimed at Russia, although China, North Korea, Iran and others have also been implicated in cybercrimes committed inside the US. The strategy is necessary after Russian President Vladimir Putin’s obvious reluctance to curb ransomware operators. Mainstream ransomware operates know that if they avoid running inside Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States they will probably be left alone.

Other options

Giving out rewards is not the only path the US will be pursuing though. The rewards are a part of a larger strategy that also entails:

• Hardening US institutions’ defenses against ransomware attacks.
• Making it harder to cash out cryptocurrencies gained by illegal means.
• Better international cooperation against ransomware.

We have seen some examples of these strategies at work when:

• The US Department of Justice recovered much of the ransomware payment that Colonial Pipeline paid to free itself from an attack that derailed the oil and gas supplier’s operations for several days.
• Warnings to expose ongoing Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) exploitation of five publicly known vulnerabilities.
• International actions against ransomware groups like Emotet and Cl0p.

The U.S. is not alone when it calls for more international cooperation against ransomware. Speaking at the INTERPOL High-Level Forum on Ransomware, Interpol’s secretary general Jürgen Stock urged police agencies and industry partners to work together to prevent what looks like a future ransomware pandemic. Secretary General Stock said that while some solutions existed nationally or bi-laterally, effectively preventing and disrupting ransomware meant adopting the same international collaboration used to fight terrorism, human trafficking, and mafia groups.

Sharing information would be an important part of such international cooperation, but there are talks about opening up other information sources. Like making it mandatory that victim organizations share information about how frequently such attacks occur and how they’re perpetrated, so others can learn from them.

More information about the reward offer is located on the Rewards for Justice website. The Tor-based tips-reporting channel can be found at the .onion URL below (you will need the Tor browser to access it):

he5dybnt7sr6cm32xt77pazmtm65flqy6irivtflruqfc5ep7eiodiad.onion

Stop Ransomware

A good fit in the overall strategy is the launch of the StopRansomware website launched by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) with the intention to become an official one-stop location for resources to tackle ransomware more effectively. The new StopRansomware.gov website is a collaborative effort across the federal government and the first joint website created to help private and public organizations mitigate their ransomware risk.

The Secretary of Homeland Security said: “As ransomware attacks continue to rise around the world, businesses and other organizations must prioritize their cybersecurity … I urge every organization across our country to use this new resource to learn how to protect themselves from ransomware and reduce their cybersecurity risk.”

The post US offers huge reward in fight against state-sponsored cybercriminals appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

This blog post was written in collaboration with members of the Threat Intelligence Team.

Last week, US news outlet NBC News caused a stir with an article proclaiming that the REvil ransomware used in the recent, colossal Kaseya supply-chain attack was “written to avoid computers that use Russian.”

The attack, one of the largest and most dramatic ransomware attacks in history, happened at a time when the Biden administration was escalating its rhetoric over Russian cyber-activity. To the uninitiated, and the NBC headline writer, it looked like a “new revelation.” Readers were invited to join the geopolitical dots.

But the stir it caused, at least among those familiar with ransomware, wasn’t surprise that REvil was coded to avoid Russia, but surprise that anybody would be surprised by that. TrustWave, authors of the the report the article was based on, certainly weren’t surprised that REvil didn’t want to run in Russia. They give it barely a mention.

Ransomware really caught the world’s attention in May when threat actors using DarkSide ransomware kicked the hornet’s nest by attacking the Colonial Pipeline, the largest fuel pipeline in the US. But as many readers will know, ransomware attacks have been relentless over the past few years, escalating each year. Even a global pandemic didn’t hamper the ransomware gangs’ activities, and just this year targets have included countless private companies, as well as hospitals, law enforcement agencies, governments, charities, and critical infrastructure.

There are multiple groups creating and developing different strains of ransomware—and many more affiliates enticed to use it to conduct their own attacks. Although their attacks follow similar patterns, there is constant innovation of tools, tactics and technology. And while some groups are cooperating, more or less, others work alone.

Yet, they all of them have one thing in common: Ransomware really, really doesn’t want to run in Russia or members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and it never has.

Russia-averse ransomware families

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS, for short, or Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv in Russian), is an international organization comprised of Russia and other republics that used to be part of the Soviet Union. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are member states of CIS. The two founding states, Ukraine and Turkmenistan, are allowed to participate in CIS although they are not recognized as official members.

Malwarebytes researchers have compiled a list of the most prolific ransomware families based on the number of known attacks in the first half of 2021 (this does not include the cascading Kaseya attack from July) and whether or not that ransomware will run in the CIS. None of them do. Almost anything is fair game for ransomware gangs it seems, unless it happens to be located in the CIS.

Among the 13 ransomware families listed in the table, 10 are known to be active. Avaddon and DarkSide seem to have been disrupted by law enforcement agencies. The CL0P money laundering operation was raided in June but attacks involving that ransomware have continued. The group behind Babuk Loader recently announced it was quitting the ransomware encryption scene but its ransomware builder later emerged on VirusTotal, and ransomware built with it has since been used in attacks. Following the enormous Kaseya attack, the websites and infrastructure of the REvil ransomware group have been shut down. Despite rampant speculation, the cause is unknown.

How ransomware avoids CIS countries

There are a number of techniques that ransomware creators commonly use and include in their code to avoid CIS countries, such as hard-coding country names and geographical territories, and checking the system language.

Some threat actors include code to check for the default system language by, for example, calling the GetUserDefaultLangID or GetLocaleInfoW functions, which return a language particular to a user—American English, for example. Another checking process retrieves the victim’s IP address via a public API, such as api.ipify.org. Because IP addresses are allocated geographically they can be used to guess the user’s rough location.

Although ransomware tries very hard not to run in Russia or the CIS, sometimes it does. Where ransomware has netted systems in those countries by accident the attackers have been known to hand over decryptor keys and apologize for the error.

On rare occasions threat actors have also chosen to avoid other targets based on the country they’re in. Famously, a Syrian father took to Twitter to plead with Coveware to mediate between him and GandCrab ransomware operators, to let him see his boys again. In an underground forum post, GandCrab threat actors decided to release decryption keys to anyone else affected by their attack in Syria. They also stated that not including Syria in the list of countries to avoid was a mistake. Their benevolence was patchy though, and targets outside Syria, including hospitals, were still considered fair game.

Why does ransomware avoid Russia?

So what’s behind ransomware’s keenness to avoid attacks inside the CIS? Although it’s possible that some ransomware gangs operate with the active cooperation of the Russian state, that isn’t the prevailing view.

The Biden administration, and many security professionals, believe that ransomware gangs are either operating with Russia’s blessing or that the country is turning a blind eye. Ransomware gangs don’t expect to face any penalty from inside the CIS, provided they avoid attacking its organizations. And since Russia has no extradition treaty with the US, the gangs operating there are also unreachable and untouchable by US law enforcement.

Put simply, ransomware is a low risk, high reward form of cybercrime, if you avoid the CIS.

The mood music is changing though, and efforts to increase the risks criminals face are underway. Even before the Colonial Pipeline attack in April, US government officials and cybersecurity experts were beginning to talk about ransomware as a threat to national security. 

“Those behind these malicious activities should be held accountable for their actions. That includes governments that do not use the full extent of their authority to stop the culprits,” says Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas in a speech he gave on March 31.

This sentiment is also echoed by the Ransomware Task Force (RTF), a group of expert volunteers tasked with tackling the ransomware problem and finding ways to disrupt it. In its April report [PDF], the RTF urged the US government to spearhead international coordination efforts to tackle the global problem of ransomware. Among a host of recommendations, it also suggested that ransomware be viewed as a threat to national security, and that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, otherwise known as the RICO Act, be expanded to include ransomware gangs.

On several occasions, the Biden administration has indicated it intends to aggressively go after ransomware gangs. This includes treating, investigating, and prosecuting ransomware attacks as if they were terrorism. Involving the military is also being carefully considered, according to Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo. Meanwhile, General Secretary of Nato Jens Stoltenberg told BBC Newsnight that the organization could respond to cyberattacks with military force “by air, sea, or land.”

Don’t invest in Russian keyboards

Regardless of whether ransomware—or any malware, for that matter—checks to see if its victim is in a CIS or CIS-affiliated state or not, it is worth remembering that the “big game” attacks they are used in are not automated. A level of human involvement is part of the modus operandi.

So, before you think about buying Russian keyboards, installing Russian language packs, or other weird tricks, realize that by the time a ransomware operator has put themselves in a position to attack you, they know a lot about you and your business, such as where your main HQ and satellite offices are. Trying to convince them otherwise—at any point, really—is a bit ridiculous, impractical, and a waste of effort.

Perhaps Fabian Woser, chief technology officer of Emsisoft, said it best:

Our advice: Avoid weird tricks. There is no substitute for a robust strategy of defense in depth.

The post Ransomware’s Russia problem appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

SonicWall has issued an urgent security notice warning users of unpatched End-Of-Life (EOL) SRA & SMA 8.X remote access devices that they have been made aware of an imminent ransomware campaign using stolen credentials. The exploitation targets a known vulnerability that has been patched in newer versions of SonicWall firmware.

In addition to the notice posted to its website, SonicWall sent out an email to anyone using SMA and SRA devices, urging some to disconnect specific devices (see below under Mitigation) immediately.

SonicWall

SonicWall is a company that specializes in securing networks. It sells a range of Internet appliances primarily directed at content control and network security, including devices providing services for network firewalls, unified threat management (UTM), virtual private networks (VPNs), and anti-spam for email.

Devices at risk

The devices that the security notice mentions are running 8.x versions of the firmware. Because these versions have reached their end of life they are unpatched. The notice mentions by type:

• Secure Mobile Access (SMA) 100 series
• Older Secure Remote Access (SRA) series

A lifecycle table for these products can be found here.

Vulnerability

In its report, SonicWall reports that ransomware attacks are being launched against these products using a known vulnerability in the 8.x firmware. This vulnerability has been patched in the later 9.x and 10.x firmware versions. It describes continuing to use its end-of-life products or 8.x firmware as “an active security risk” and at “imminent risk of a targeted ransomware attack”.

It is unclear which ransomware variant was caught targeting these devices, but last month NCC Group’s Incident Response team observed a new variant of the FiveHands ransomware using an externally facing SonicWall VPN appliance as the initial access vector.

Mitigation

The notice mentions the following products along with recommended actions:

• SRA 4600/1600 (EOL 2019) disconnect immediately and reset passwords.
• SRA 4200/1200 (EOL 2016) disconnect immediately and reset passwords.
• SSL-VPN 200/2000/400 (EOL 2013/2014) disconnect immediately and reset passwords.
• SMA 400/200 Update to 10.2.0.7-34 or 9.0.0.10 immediately, reset passwords, and enable MFA.
• SMA 210/410/500v (Actively Supported) update firmware to 9.0.0.10-28sv or later, or to 10.2.0.7-34sv or later.

Additionally users are advised to immediately reset all credentials associated with SMA or SRA devices, as well as any other devices or systems that use the same credentials.

As is often the case, there is no rocket science here, just security bread and butter. That doesn’t mean that doing security is easy, but it does show the importance of staying on top of some basics: Using any product that’s out of support and unable or unlikely to get security updates is security risk that only gets worse over time; Using out of date software or firmware with known security vulnerabilities is similarly risky; and, as ever, it’s wise you use multifactor authentication (MFA) wherever you can.

Security devices as a way in

In the continuous wave of ransomware attacks you may have noticed a trend where the software and devices that are designed to keep you safe, are being used to establish the opposite. This year we have seen Pulse Secure vulnerabilities exploited in the wild, CISA warnings about successful attacks targeting a number of years-old vulnerabilities, and the colossal Kaseya supply-chain attack, among others.

Even when this may seem ironic, it does make sense. Cybercriminals will obviously use any available entrance into their target’s network. And defenses that control in- and outbound traffic like VPN’s, firewalls, and routers are attractive, privileged targets that users are often reluctant to bring down for maintenance. Vulnerabilities in these systems are golden opportunities for cybercriminals. So, it shouldn’t need any explanation why it is imperative to patch or remove such vulnerable devices as soon as possible.

Stay safe, everyone!

The post SonicWall warns users of “imminent ransomware campaign” appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

It’s a turbulent time in the cryptomining realm, especially for malware authors. Some big attacks and a lot of publicity has resulted in prolific groups promising to disband, even if potentially only temporarily.

Running a tight(er) ship

The mining banhammer continues to swing as China keeps putting pressure on miners to do it elsewhere. The US is tipped to become a hotspot for mining activity off the back of some of these actions, despite promises of a crackdown because of the enabling role cryptocurrency plays in ransomware attacks. India is still wondering about the ramifications of a cryptocurrency ban.

On top of all that, cryptocurrency mining away from infected desktops is suffering multiple problems. Computer part shortages are tipped to last anything up to two years. Graphics card shortages are so bad, miners are resorting to smuggling them, alongside other components.

Holding all the cards

Graphics cards are crucial for the task of mining. They’re the main source of mining muscle when it comes to making computations. In fact, large scale mining operations made up of little more than big warehouses and racks of machines crunching numbers are common. This means, of course, there are also plenty of illicit mining operations to contend with. Electricity theft, environmental impact, and the potentially dubious sourcing of equipment are all things to be considered.

Sure enough, the crackdowns keep coming.

Shutting it all down

It’s reported that Ukraine police “seized around 9,000 game consoles and computers in an illegal crypto mine”. Roughly $259,000 in electricity was stolen every month until the racket was shut down. This story has everything: Electricity meters not reflecting correct consumption, criminal proceedings in relation to electricity, thermal, and water theft, “more than 500 graphics cards” in addition to the computers and consoles…put simply, the works. The future is now, and it apparently involves drones tracking crypto thieves.

This is an astonishingly turbulent set of behind the scenes circumstances, chugging away in the background while dishonest miners try to make a living. That’s before we get to the volatile nature of Bitcoin’s value, seemingly nudged by memes and random tweets.

Throw in Vladimir Putin agreeing with Joe Biden to do something about ransomware emanating from Russia, and things feel a bit like they’re rushing towards a tipping point for criminals. No matter where miners pop up, the method of distribution is being observed, analysed, and shut down.

Ransomware’s weak link?

Back in the days when adware was at its peak, at some key point bundles became too problematic, too many people were yelling about it, too many cases went legal. In short, it was safer to abandon ship and move into other areas. Fake anti-spyware “You’re infected!” messages were everywhere at one point. In time, that style of trickery slowly became replaced by ransomware as the go-to method for fakeouts and extortion.

Arguably, ransomware couldn’t exist in its current form without pseudonymous cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Monero. But the transparency that gives these blockchain-based currencies their strength is arguably their biggest weakness too. Transactions are public, traceable, and available for forensic analysis forever—they’re just hard to link to individuals.

In June, the Wall Street Journal reported that the White House was “pushing to better trace ransomware payments.” At around the same time, the US Department of Justice successfully retrieved most of the ransom payment made in the Colonial Pipeline attack after tracing the passage of the payment through the Bitcoin blockchain. A week later the Cl0p ransomware gang’s money laundering operation was raided by Ukrainian police thanks to similar cryptocurrency tracing.

Ransomware payments have clearly been identified as a weak link, and while transactions on blockchains are frozen in time, the software and hardware used to analyse them improves with the passage of Moore’s law.

Ransomware gangs and scammers have had a fine old time of it up until now but it’s becoming increasingly hard to ignore the real-world battleground cryptocurrencies finds themselves in. Some of these changes and ramifications will almost certainly impact on their online activities. The question is, will they weather the storm, or is the rug slowly being pulled out from under the feet of criminal cryptocurrency activity as the risk becomes too great?

The post Is crypto’s criminal rollercoaster approaching a terminal dip? appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

The list of July 2021 Patch Tuesday updates looks endless. 117 patches with no less than 42 CVEs assigned to them that have FAQs, mitigations details or workarounds listed for them. Looking at the urgency levels Microsoft has assigned to them, system administrators have their work cut out for them once again:

• 13 criticial patches
• 103 important patches

You can find the list of CVEs that have FAQs, mitigations, or workarounds on the Microsoft July release notes page.

Six vulnerabilities were previously disclosed and four are being exploited in-the-wild, according to Microsoft. One of those CVE’s is a familiar one, 2021-34527 aka the anyone-can-run-code-as-domain-admin RCE known as PrintNightmare. Microsoft issued out-of-band patches for that vulnerability a week ago, but those were not as comprehensive as one might have hoped.

Since then, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) has issued Emergency Directive 21-04, “Mitigate Windows Print Spooler Service Vulnerability” because it is aware of active exploitation, by multiple threat actors, of the PrintNightmare vulnerability. These directive list required actions for all Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies.

Priorities

Besides the ongoing PrintNightmare, er, nightmare, there are some others that deserve your undivided attention. Vulnerabilities being exploited in the wild, besides PrintNightmare, are:

• CVE-2021-34448  Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability for Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 10.
• CVE-2021-33771  Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability for Windows Server 2012, Server 2016, Windows 8.1, and Windows 10.
• CVE-2021-31979 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability for Windows 7, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2016, and Windows Server 2019.

Other vulnerabilities that are not seen exploited in the wild yet, but are likely candidates to make that list soon:

• CVE-2021-34458 Windows Kernel Remote Code Execution Vulnerability for some Windows Server versions, if the system is hosting virtual machines, or the Server includes hardware with SR-IOV devices.
• CVE-2021-34494  Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability for Windows Server versions if the server is configured to be a DNS server.

Exchange Server

Another ongoing effort to patch vulnerable systems has to do with Microsoft Exchange Server. Flaws that were actually already patched in April have now been assigned new CVE numbers CVE-2021-34473 (Microsoft Exchange Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability) and CVE-2021-34523 (Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability). As you may remember this combo of elevation of privilege (EOP) and remote code execution (RCE) caused quite the panic when  attackers started using the Exchange bugs to access vulnerable servers before establishing web shells to gain persistence and steal information.

If you applied the patches in April, you are already protected. If you didn’t, move them to the top of your to-do-list.

Windows Media Foundation

Two other critical vulnerabilities, and one considered important, were found in Microsoft Windows Media Foundation. Microsoft Media Foundation enables the development of applications and components for using digital media on Windows Vista and later. If you do have this multimedia platform installed on your system you are advised to apply the patches, but note that many of them include the Flash Removal Package. So do the patches for CVE-2021-34497 a critical Windows MSHTML Platform RCE vulnerability.

Stay safe, everyone!

The post Four in-the-wild exploits, 13 critical patches headline bumper Patch Tuesday appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.

Elon Musk is an incredibly popular target for scammers and spammers on social media. Attach his name to something he has no involvement in and watch it fly. Verified accounts on Twitter continue to be favourites for account compromise / fake Elon scams. Those often turn out to be Bitcoin related. Sometimes, it’s on a grand scale.

There are other Elon scams out there, though.

Elon, word searches, and watches

Here’s one currently doing the rounds on Twitter. It’s not Bitcoin for a change, nor does it appear to exclusively be the domain of verified accounts.

What happens is this:

A Twitter account goes viral with a popular (or even semi-popular) tweet.

An account which is almost certainly a bot replies to the popular tweet. They don’t appear to post anything coherent which is peculiar. You don’t want your fake message to loudly proclaim “I’m fake”, but we’re already perilously close in this instance. Two random words are mashed into a reply, along with a screenshot.

The screenshot appears to show Elon Musk, on Twitter, saying:

Just google “Topmid Dust Watch” and thank me later.

He hasn’t said anything of the kind, but anyone searching for this phrase will be met with…well…bafflement, for the most part.

Scrabbling in the dust

The aim of the game here is presumably to bypass spam detection, via images of bogus tweets. The very common name of the watch in this case (“Dust watch”) means the results are filled with YouTube videos and gaming articles about the popular CounterStrike map “Dust”. As far as results regarding watches go, there’s just a few scattered here and there. Easy to miss in a plethora of gaming pages and videos!

Now, we can’t say which site is tied to the spam messages on Twitter. The site responsible may already be offline. Instead, let’s outline what happens should you search for this product.

A “free” watch?

Tactics such as the above usually lead to portals “selling” the item for a grand total of $0. What you actually pay here is shipping only, calculated once you enter your address. However, you may not want to get your credit card out just yet.

This isn’t a recent marketing technique; sites giving away free stuff and “just” charging shipping have been around for years. And sites doing so-called limited time offers on shipping only watches had some attention in 2017.

What do offers really cost online?

Generally speaking, people should avoid suggestions to go search words and / or products in the replies of social media posts. The same goes for promotions pushed by accounts you know, or even verified accounts. There’s always a chance what you’re seeing is the result of a compromise. You’ve no idea what waits at the other end of a link, or indeed search result. It might be a slight peculiar watch offer, or something else altogether like phishing or malware.

If it’s too good to be true…well, you know the rest.

The post Nope, that isn’t Elon Musk, and he isn’t offering a free Topmist Dust watch either appeared first on Malwarebytes Labs.